## Statistically insignificant



BIBEK DEBROY & ADITYA SINHA

The UN Statistical Commission (UNSC) was The UN Statistical Commission (UNSC) was established in 1947 (after a 1944 fersolution). Whatever the UN's Statistics Division does is under supervision of the UNSC. In turn, UNSC feeds upwards into the UN Economics and Social Council (ECOSOC). UNSC has 24 members. As with other UN bodies, there is a geographical quota and the current composition has five from Africa, four each from Asia-Pacific, East Europe and Latin Americane and Latin America and the Caribbean, and seven from

America and the Caribbean, and seven from West Europe.
With that geographical composition, members are elected for four years and India has been elected, with effect from January 1, 2024. One doesn't have to be a member or chairman to participate in UNSC discussions. After the 37th session held in 2006,

in 2007 at its 60th anniversary UNSC brought out a compendium (the 54th session was held in 2023).

This compendium told us India was mong the most frequent participants, havamong the most frequent participants, nav-ing done that 37 times. There were 35 occa-sions when India participated as a member. However, if one tracks when India had chairmanship or was a member, one will have to go far back in history. India chaired in 1976 (V R Rao), 1956 (P C Mahalanobis) and 1954 (P C Mahalanobis) it had the posi-tion of vice-chairman in 2003 (K K Isaswa) ind 1934 (Fundamiana) (Fundamia there were two sessions that year), and rap-porteur in 1999 (M D Asthana). To be chair-man, vice-chairman or rapporteur, one has to be a member.

Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis needs

no introduction. His influence and contrib-utions transcended statistics. Indian Statuttons transcended statistics, inflath stat-stictal Institute (ISI), National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) and Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) bear his stamp. Some-times, we forget he was statistical adviser to the Cabinet in 1949. This is what UNSC had to say about Mahalanobis: "Mahalano



ing all the sessions of the Statistical Com-mission, from the so-called nuclear session in 1946 to the 16th session in 1970. He served the commission in various capacities, namethe commission in various capacities, name-ly member, rapporteur, vice-chair and final-ly chair in 1954 and 1956. He made ground breaking contributions to the commission during its formative years. The creation of during its formative years. In ereation to the sub-commission on statistical sampling was his initiative. This sub-commission's final Recommendations for the Preparation of Sample Survey Report (1947) paved the way for the application of sample surveys in various fields of official statistics." Over

the years, the number of unemores in UNSC, increased from 12 to 24. The number of UN members also increased. Therefore, competition and lobbying to become a member increased. However, as long as Mahalanobis was around, it is fair to say that there was respect for the quality of India's official statistics, within and without UNSC.

Mahalanobis was Mahalanobis to Mahalanobis Mahalanobis was a managed to the control of the c

Mahalanobis was Mahalanobis, He Mahalanobis was Manaianobis. rie didn't belong to the Indian Statistical Service (ISS). Vakkalanka R Rao isn't as well known as Mahalanobis. He joined ISS and some people may remember him for India's first-ever agricultural census and the 1960 committee on panchayati raj sta-

tistics. In 1976, when he was the chairman ustrus. In 1976, when the was the chailman of UNSC, in a departure from usual prac-tice, the session was held in Delhi, at the invitation of the Indian government. There is a long list of great statisticians from India, not just Mahalanobis or C R Rao. Debabrata Basu, Jayanta Kumar Ghosh, K C Sreedharan Pillai, Raghu Raj Rabadur, take uvan piele.

Bahadur, take your pick. But when we mention UNSC, we have something else in mind. We have in mind statisticians who work within the government system.

ment system.

It is fair to state the fol-lowing. 1) India's official sta-tistics and "official" statisticians were greatly respected in the 1950s, all the way

in the 1950s, all the way down to the 1960s, remem-bering, of course, that in something like UNSC, what is relevant is relative compari-son, not absolute. We slipped, while other countries improved both. 2) Kiron Chandra Seal was also laterally inducted into ISS. Seal was also laterally inducted into ISS. Therefore, in large measure, this is about ISS. Earlier, academic statisticians joined ISS. They published even after joining ISS and were respected as statisticians. When we deplore the quality of government statistics, we often ignore this human resource angle. 3) India seems to have lost interest in UNSC after 2003. Election as member or

chairman is a function of voting and lobtion isn't only a function of lobbying. There has to be credibility, too, That credibility of

official statistics and official

or frical statistics and official statisticans, steadily undermined, has to be restored. Membership of UNSC is a trigger to chart out that revamp. In 2001, there was an excellent report on revampsts and id we excellent report on revamping statistics (the Rangarajan report), Gleventhe focus, it did have a chapter on human resources. But the emphasis was on training, promotion and carder review, nothing substantive. It is odd that a National Statistical Commission should be set up in 2005 and, without implying causation, India should become relatively irrelevant in UNSC roughly at the same time. If we do not rectify this now, we never will. The time for comp-

this now, we never will. The time for comp lacency has long passed; India's position in the realm of statistics hangs in the balance.

## RBI takes governance of banks on board

At a first-of-its-kind open house with bank boards next month, Mint Road can be expected to do some plain speaking on long-festering issues of management and ethics

RAGHU MOHAN New Delhi, 27 April

int Road's decision to call for a meeting of the board for a meeting of the board and private banks on May 22 and 29 to discuss "sissuse related to governance, ethics, the role of the boards, and supervisory expectations" needs to be read in the context of several leno-standing concerns.

Succession planning at private Succession pianning at private banks is one hot button issue. On September 9, 2014, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) made clear that the upper age limit for corner-room occupants in private banks should be 70 years. Yet, much drama unfolded in the race to find successors to both Romesh Sobit at Ledwight Bank and Aditive Duri or IndusInd Bank, and Aditya Puri a IndusInd Bank, and Aditya Puri at HDFC Bank, Business Standard had reported on April 24, 2019, that Mint Road had been "informally sounded out" whether it can look into the matter of increasing the age limit for directors on banks' boards to align it with the Companies Act, where the pre-scribed age limit is 75 years.

Almost a year later, Governor Shakikanta Das said that RBI will not Shakikanta Dassaid that KBi Will not be giving in to the demand to up the retirement age of private bank chiefs. "One must retire when people ask 'why' and not 'why not," Das said (quoting Sunil Gavaskar). Both Sobti and Puri bid their "byes" on March 23, 2020, and October 26, 2020, respectively on turning 70.

respectively, on turning 70. Why is it that an RBI circular why is it that an RBI circular issued six years before the end of tenures of the two longest servings managing directors and chief executive officers (CEOs) is not taken as cue enough to get a succession process in place? Is it possible that the central bank feels that on several other counts as well, a "drift" may be on?

Penalties are another issue. The RBI's Report on Trend and Progress

FY22 has it that during this period the major reasons for the imposi-tion of monetary penal-ties on banks were due on-compliance exposure with exposure and IRAC (income recognition and asset classification), frauds classification and reporting, and violation of cybersecurity framework guidelines. The average per instance penalty was the highest for private banks — un at 200

was the highest for private banks — up at ₹9.31 crore in 16 instances from ₹5.92 crore (3). When it comes to frauds in banks (whatever their ownership), the RBI's Annual Report for F12 noted that the average time lag between the date of occurrence of a fraud and its detection is 23 months; for large frauds (₹100 crore and above), it was 57 months. This tardiness must be set against at two-decadal analysis by the Financial tardiness must be set against a two-decadal analysis by the Financial Stability Report of June 2019 (FSR-2010), which observed that between FYOI and FYIS, fraud constituted 90.6 per cent of what was reported in FYI9, by value. In September 2019, Deputy Governor M K Jain said: "It will not

be an exaggeration to say that some of the big losses suffered by banks on account of frauds could have peen avoided if a good compliance culture was ingrained in the respec-tive banks." And on Thursday, Das n his speech on "Future-Proofing



**ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS** 

	April 2020-M	arch 2021	April 2021-March 2022		
Regulated entity	Instances of imposition of penalty	Total penalty (₹cr)	Instances of imposition of penalty	Total penalty (₹cr)	
Public sector banks	4.0	9.5	13.0	17.55	
Private sector banks	3.0	5.92	16.0	29.39	
Cooperative banks	43.0	3.89	145.0	12.1	
Foreign banks	3.0	8.0	4.0	4.25	
Payments banks	1.0	1.0	-	-	
Small finance banks	-	-	1.0	1.0	
NBFCs	7.0	3.1	10.0	1.03	
Total	61.0	31.4	189.0	65.3	

the Indian Financial System" delivthe Indian Financial System" deliv-ered at the College of Supervisors in Mumbai said: "Over-aggressive growth strategies or mindless pur-suit of bottom lines, for instance, are often a precursor to future prob-lems." That regulated entities must demonstrate adequacy of internal controls and loss absorption capac-ity to match the risks that their business models may experate.

ity to match the risks that men-business models may generate.

"Our approach is to flag deficiencies in this area to the senior management or to the Board of Directors management the Board of Di of individual institu tions for remedial

Now let's look at

Now let's look at the view from the other side of the fence — banks. A controversial "Discussion paper on governance in com-mercial banks in India" (June II, 2020) les at priyate banks II's

India" (June II, 2020)
raised hackles at private banks. It
held that CEOs are not to have a
place on key board committees
remuneration and nomination;
audit, and risk management. And
key officials are to report to boardlevel committees, and not to the
CEOs. A case was made through the
Indian Banks' Association (to the
RBI) that this will dilute the position
of CEOs under the Banking
Regulation Act (BR Act), 1949, that
states: "The management of the Regulation Act (BK ACt), 1949, that states: "The management of the whole of the affairs of such a banking company shall be entrusted to a managing director who shall exercise his powers subject to the superintendence, control and direction of the board of directors."

This discussion paper led to a few independent directors informally conveying to chairmen and CEOs that they would have to revisit their positions even as some of them reportedly raised the mat-ter with the ministry of finance in

not want to be burdened with "executive roles" (save for in the credit committee) and their role has to be restricted to what they con-sider "strategic". ler "strategic". Now, why did state-run banks not

Now, why due state-run banks not get hassled by the RBI discussion paper? This is because, while the applicability of the contents cut across banks, it had been qualified that "except in so far as what is pre-LIMI except in so far as what is pre-scribed is not inconsistent with the provisions of specific statutes appli-cable to them, or in case where the major shareholder/promoter viz., Government of India, retains its instructions".

It's possible that the RBI's proposed

It's possible that the RBI's proposed interaction with banks' boards flows from all these long-standing concerns, which had been aired, but banks may not have read the tea leaves.

On November 16, 2021, Das had spoken of the high expectations from the oversight role of bank boards. He made a pointed reference to the fact that certain banks had followed the high-risk and high-prup business stratew. With a

followed the high-risk and high-return business strategy, "with a skewed priority for serving only the interest of their investors". And the nole of the board, especially in chal-lenging the proposals of the man-agement, thus becomes critical. "The cult of personalities on banks boards" may well be over. The proposed RBI-bank boards' freeting is a significant first step fol-lowing Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman's announcement in the Union Budget for FV24 on the need for better governance and investor protection in the banking sector. To this end, Sitharaman had proposed certain amendments to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934; the BR Act, 1949; and the Banking Companies

Bank of India Act, 1934; the BK Act, 1949; and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970.

Interestingly, the twin meetings slotted for May comes a month ahead of the release of the Financial Stability Report's June 2023 edition.

## **BAJAJ HOLDINGS & INVESTMENT LIMITED**

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Website: www.bhil.in | E-mail ID: investors@bhil.in | Telephone: +91 20 71576066

	(₹ In Croi				
Sr. No.	Particulars	Quarter ended 31.03.2023 Audited	Quarter ended 31.03.2022 Audited	Year ended 31.03.2023 Audited	Year ended 31.03.2022 Audited
1	Revenue from operations	86.69	89.46	464.09	429.69
2	Profit before tax	1,367.64	1,121.77	5,011.51	4,225.90
3	Profit for the period (attributable to owners of the company)	1,352.75	1,105.39	4,850.52	4,055.68
4	Total comprehensive income (attributable to owners of the company)	190.46	914.20	3,413.91	6,844.30
5	Paid-up equity share capital	111.29	111.29	111.29	111.29
6	Other equity (as shown in the Balance Sheet of previous year)			44,071.49	42,730.96
7	Basic and diluted earnings per share (₹) (not annualised) (Face value of ₹ 10 each)	121.5	99.3	435.8	364.4

key standardne infantial information is given below:					(Cili Cibie)
Sr. No.	Particulars	Quarter ended 31.03.2023 Audited	Quarter ended 31.03.2022 Audited	Year ended 31.03.2023 Audited	Year ended 31.03.2022 Audited
1	Total income	96.35	94.69	1,937.01	1,833.16
2	Profit before tax	59.08	61.03	1,778.85	1,701.12
3	Profit after tax	45.13	46.13	1,711.58	1,630.52

te: The above is an extract of the audited financial results for the quarter and financial year ended 31 March 2023 which have been reviewed by e Audit Committee, approved by Board of Directors at its meeting held on 27 April 2023, subjected to audit by statutory auditors and filed with stock exchanges under Regulation 33 of SEIL (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, amended. The full format the aforesaid financial results is available on the website of the Company, BSE Limited and National Stock Exchange of India Limited i.e. ww.blinli, nw.wb.seindia.com and www.nseindia.com respectively.

By order of the Board of Directors For Bajaj Holdings & Investment Limited

Sanjiv Bajaj Managing Director & CEO

## **BAJAJ FINSERV LIMITED**

CIN: L65923PN2007PLC130075 | Registered Office: Mumbai - Pune Road, Akurdi, Pune 411 035 Corporate Office: Off Pune - Ahmednagar Road, Viman Nagar, Pune - 411 014

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				(₹ In Crore)
Particulars	Quarter ended 31.03.2023 Audited	Quarter ended 31.03.2022 Audited	Year ended 31.03.2023 Audited	Year ended 31.03.2022 Audited
Revenue from operations	23,624.61	18,861.67	82,071.24	68,406.08
Profit before tax	4,540.46	3,462.20	16,811.13	11,270.58
Profit for the period (attributable to owners of the company)	1,768.95	1,346.08	6,417.28	4,556.77

Other equity (as shown in the Balance Sheet of previous year) 46,248.08 40,167.23 Earnings per share (not annualised) (Face value of ₹1each)
Basic (₹) Key standalone financial information is given below (₹ In Crore

Sr. No.	Particulars	Quarter ended 31.03.2023 Audited	Quarter ended 31.03.2022 Audited	Year ended 31.03.2023 Audited	Year ended 31.03.2022 Audited
1	Total income	51.51	49.15	1,147.61	729.00
2	Profit before tax	13.80	20.51	974.62	563.22
3	Profit after tax	9.46	16.87	732.52	424.23

Note: The above is an extract of the audited financial results for the quarter and financial year ended 31 March 2023 which have been reviewed by the Audit Committee, approved by Board of Directors at its meeting held on 27 April 2023, subjected to audit by statutory auditors and filed with the stock exchanges under Regulation 33 of SEIQ (Listing Dibligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, as a mended. The full format of the aforesaid financial results is available on the website of the Company, BSE Limited and National Stock Exchange of India Limited i.e. www.bajafilnservin, www.bsaidia.com and www.nseindia.com the respectively.

27 April 2023

Paid-up equity share capital



79.57



















